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UNJUST ACCESS TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE ACT: A PROPOSAL TO CLOSE THE
ACT'S ELIGIBILITY LOOPHOLE FOR
MEMBERS OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The "American Rule" mandates that prevailing litigants generally
must bear the burden of their own attorneys' fees.' While the
American Rule is well settled among American courts,2 there are
several statutory exceptions to the Rule that permit litigants to
recover their attorneys' fees under certain conditions.3 One such
1. An American court first recognized the American Rule in 1796. See Arcambel v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). In Arcambel, the Court denied the prevailing party's
request for attorneys' fees. The Court opined that "[t]he general practice of the United States is
in opposition to [granting a prevailing party's request for attorneys' fees]; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is
changed, or modified, by statute." Id. For a discussion of the history of the American Rule, see
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw &
CONrTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984). In contrast to the American Rule, the "English Rule" generally
allows the prevailing litigant to recover attorneys' fees from the losing litigant. For a brief
discussion of the English Rule, see Mary Frances Derfer, The True "American Rule"
Drafting Fee Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 251,251 n.1 (1979).
2. The Supreme Court endorsed the American Rule as early as 1975. See Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-62 (1975) (holding that prevailing
parties in federal litigation may not recover their attorneys' fees unless Congress has expressly
authorized a fee-shifting statute pertinent to the case at bar); see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1986) (noting the vitality of the
American Rule despite its numerous statutory exceptions).
3. Courts traditionally have acknowledged four general exceptions to the American Rule.
See Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 562 n.6. The principal exception is congressional
authorization for the courts to require one party to pay attorneys' fees to the other party. See id.
A second general exception to the American Rule is courts' authority to enforce their own
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exception to the American Rule is the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA).4 Under the EAJA, courts may award reasonable attorneys'
orders by assessing attorneys' fees against a party that willftully violates a court order. See id.
Another general exception to the American Rule is courts' authority to award fees against a
losing party that has acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id.
Finally, courts may use their equitable powers to award attorneys' fees in commercial litigation
to plaintiffs who recover a "common fund" for themselves and others through antitrust or
securities litigation. See id.
Apart from these four general exceptions, there are at least one hundred codified statutory
exceptions to the American Rule. See id.; see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (1994) (permitting a party to recover attorneys' fees from the United States in an
action based on the government's improper withholding of agency records); Privacy Act of
1974,5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1994) (allowing a prevailing party to recover its attorneys' fees
from the United States in an action based on the government's wrongful disclosure of personal
records); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i) (1994) (providing that a
prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees from the United States in an action based on the
government's failure to conduct certain meetings in a manner open to public observation); Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1994) (providing for an award of attorneys' fees against a
party who has refused to rent or sell housing to another party based on race, religion, or
gender); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994) (permitting a prevailing
party to recover attorneys' fees incurred while litigating against disability-based
discrimination); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994)
(authorizing an award of attorneys' fees for a party who has successfully sought a judicial
remedy for group-based employment discrimination practices); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (1994) (providing that a court issuing a final order in a suit under the Clean
Air Act can award litigation costs to any party whom the court deems worthy of such an
award); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1988) (permitting recovery of attorneys' fees by
private parties who bring actions that result in the enforcement of an important right affecting
the public interest). For a more thorough discussion of these statutory exceptions to the
American Rule, see Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney's Fees Against the
Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 769-83 (1993).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994), amended by Act of Dec. 17, 1997,28
U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West Supp. 1997). Congress first enacted the EAJA as a rider to a small
business assistance bill. See Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 201, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325
(1980). As first enacted, the EAJA contained a sunset provision that rendered the EAJA null
and void at the end of a three-year trial period. See id. at 2327 (rendering the EAJA void as of
Oct. 1, 1984). Shortly after the three-year trial period ended, Congress passed several
amendments to the EAJA. See H.R. 5479, 94th Cong. (1984) (amending, inter alia, the EAJA's
definition of an EAJA eligible party to include individuals with a net worth of no more than $2
million); see also 130 CONG. REc. H32213 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier). President Ronald Reagan found select EAJA provisions objectionable, however,
and vetoed the amended bill. See Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R. 5479, 20 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. Doc. 1814-15 (Nov. 8, 1984) (expressing the President's disapproval of the bill's
definition of "the position of the United States").
After the President vetoed the amended bill, Congress revised the bill in accordance with
the President's proposed changes. See 131 CONG. REC. S20348 (daily ed. July 24, 1985)
(statement of Sen. Grassley). Thereafter, President Reagan signed the revised bill, see
Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 21 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 966-67 (Aug. 5,
1985), and on August 5, 1985, re-enacted the EAJA as a permanent statute. See Equal Access to
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fees5 to parties that have successfully litigated6 against the federal
government in an action in which the government's position 7 was not
"substantially justified."g
A party must satisfy several eligibility requirements before
obtaining an award of EAJA funds.9 Once a party satifies these
requirements, the EAJA mandates that a court award attorneys' fees
to that party.10 Despite this mandate, some courts have challenged the
propriety of awarding attorneys' fees to certain ostensibly qualified
parties. When multiple parties have joined to litigate a claim against
the federal government, courts have refused to grant an EAJA award
to otherwise eligible parties in the presence of "mixed eligibility" '1
conditions. Such conditions arise when, in addition to the EAJA-
eligible petitioner, there existed in the underlying litigation either (1)
an EAJA-ineligible co-plaintiff, or co-defendant, who funded the
underlying litigation; 12 or (2) an EAJA-ineligible co-plaintiff, or co-
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-80,99 Stat. 186 (1985).
5. The EAJA provides for an award of "[attorneys'] fees and other expenses." 28
U.S.C.A. § 2412(dX2XA). These "other expenses" include the reasonable cost of expert
witnesses, studies, analyses, engineering reports or tests that a court may find to be critical to a
prevailing party's lawsuit. See id. Moreover, the EAJA deems unreasonable any sum of
attorneys' fees that an attorney has billed at a rate in excess of $125 per hour, unless a court
finds that "an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of
qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.' Id. The allowance for a
higher billing rate based on the "limited availability of qualified attorneys" is restricted to cases
in which an attorney has some distinct skill, as opposed to a distinct level of competence, See
Pierce v. Underwood, 489 U.S. 552 (1988).
6. A party may qualify under the EAJA regardless of whether the party was a plaintiff or
defendant in the litigation underlying a claim for attorneys' fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
7. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX1XA) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees ... incurred by that party in any civil
action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of
agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction
of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
Id.
9. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the EAJA's eligibility criteria.
10. See28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(IXA).
1I. "Mixed eligibility" refers to the presence of both an EAJA-eligible party and an
EAJA-ineligible party in an action against the federal government.
12. See, e.g., Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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defendant, who could have funded the underlying litigation.'
3
Presently, three circuit courts of appeals are split over the proper
treatment of a single-party variation on the mixed eligibility problem.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree with the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals over the EAJA-eligibility of an individually
eligible party that has litigated on behalf of one or more EAJA-
ineligible parties that were absent in the underlying litigation. 14 The
Sixth Circuit has held that an EAJA award is inappropriate under
such conditions because it would frustrate Congress's purposes for
enacting the EAJA.15 In contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
held that such a scenario should not affect the petitioning party's
EAJA eligibility.'6 Most recently, in Texas Food Industry Ass'n v.
United States Department ofAgriculture,17 the Fifth Circuit held that
a trade association which is comprised of multi-billion dollar
corporations,18 but which itself possesses a net worth of $3.3 million,
constitutes an eligible party under the EAJA and, thus, may collect
attorneys' fees under the EAJA. 19
This Note advocates that EAJA-ineligible businesses, such as the
corporate giants in Texas Food, should not be permitted to use their
EAJA-eligible trade associations as vehicles for avoiding the cost of
litigating against the federal government. Congress enacted the EAJA
to provide greater access to the courts for only those parties that lack
the financial means to gain such access on their own.20 This Note
recognizes that the EAJA, as enacted, restricts courts' ability to
13. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988).
14. Compare Texas Food Indus. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 81 F.3d 578 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a trade association's EAJA-ineligible members do not preclude the
association from recoving attorneys' fees), and Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991)
(same), with National Truck Equip. Ass'n v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 972
F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that courts should consider the net worth of each member of a
trade association for purposes of EAJA attorneys' fees awards).
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
16. See discussion infra Part III.B.I.
17. 81 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996).
18. Members of the trade association included Supervalu Inc. ($12.57 billion in annual
revenues), Fleming Companies, Inc. (annual sales of $12.93 billion), SYSCO Corp. ($8.9
billion in annual sales), and Kraft Foodservice, Inc. (annual sales of $120 million). See id. at
583 n.1 (citing STANDARD AND POOR'S REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS, DIRECTORS, AND
EXECUTIVES (1994)).
19. Seeid. at585.
20. See infra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text.
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remedy through judicial review the EAJA's eligibility loophole for
members of trade associations.21 Therefore, this Note proposes that
Congress, rather than the courts, take affirmative steps toward
rectifying the EAJA's trade association loophole by amending the
EAJA in a manner that would disallow EAJA-ineligible businesses to
hide behind the EAJA qualifications of their trade associations.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the EAJA's historical
development and "fee-shifting '22 provisions. Part III describes
courts' approaches to the EAJA's mixed eligibility problem with an
emphasis on those courts that have treated the single-party variation
of this problem. Part IV analyzes the arguments that the Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits have advanced in support of their positions
regarding the single-party mixed eligibility problem. In addition, Part
IV concludes that the Sixth Circuit's position is most consistent with
Congress's purposes for enacting the EAJA and, thus, should serve as
a model for resolving the EAJA's single-party mixed eligibility
problem. Finally, Part V of this Note proposes an EAJA amendment
that would preclude an EAJA-ineligible party from using its trade
association as a vehicle for circumventing the EAJA's eligibility
requirements.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE EAJA
A. Purpose of the EAJA
In 1980, Congress enacted a small-business assistance bill 23 in
response to widespread sentiment that administrative agencies were
burdening small businesses with excessive regulation.24 Congress
21. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the effects of the EAJA's "clear and
unambiguous" language on courts' ability to depart from that language).
22. This note uses the term "fee-shifting" to refer to a court's order that a losing litigant
pay the award of attorneys' fees of the prevailing litigant.
23. See Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980).
24. Congress believed that federal agencies disproportionately targeted small businesses
that lacked the financial means to contest agency policies and lawsuits. See Award ofAttorneys'
Fees Against the Federal Government. Hearings on § 265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 56
(1980) (testimony of Rep. McDade) (addressing oppression of "the small business owner"); see
also H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4953, 4988 (stating
that the bill's primary concern is "individuals for whom cost may be a deterrent to vindicating
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sought to curb this excessive regulation, in part, through the use of
the bill's fee-shifting provisions. 25 Congress believed that a fee-
shifting statute would deter excessive regulation in two ways. First, a
fee-shifting statute would decrease a party's costs of opposing
excessive regulation.26 Congress believed that, as a result of these
their rights").
Congress characterized its goals more broadly in its statement of findings and purpose:
The Congress finds that certain individuals, partnerships, corporations, and labor and
other organizations may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against,
unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved.... [B]ecause of
the greater resources and expertise of the United States[,] the standard for an award of
fees against the United States should be different from the standard governing an
award against a private litigant... It is the purpose of this title to diminish the
deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by
providing in specified situations an award of attorney fees... against the United States
Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980).
25. Senator Domenici, a sponsor of the EAJA bill, stated:
The basic problem this bill seeks to overcome is the inability of many Americans to
combat the vast resources of the federal government in administrative adjudications. In
the usual case the party has to weigh the high cost of litigation or agency proceedings
against the value of the rights to be asserted. Individuals and small businesses are in
far too many cases forced to knuckle under to regulations even though they have a
direct and substantial impact because they cannot afford the adjudication process. In
many cases the government can proceed in expectation of outlasting its adversary. The
purpose of the bill is to redress the balance between the government acting in its
discretionary capacity and the individual.
Award of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on § 265 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 16 (1980).
While Congress's primary goal in enacting the EAJA may have been to alleviate the
government's excessive regulation of small businesses, legislative history suggests a broader
secondary goal. By reducing the cost of challenging excessive regulation and, thus, encouraging
such challenges, Congress hoped that the EAJA would help to streamline effective legislation:
An adjudication or civil action provides a concrete, adversarial test of Government
regulation and thereby insures the legitimacy and fairness of the law. An adjudication,
for example, may show that the policy or factual foundation underlying an agency rule
is erroneous or inaccurate, or it may provide a vehicle for developing or announcing
more precise rules.
S. REP. No. 96-253, at 5-6 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4953, 4988-89.
26. See § 202, 94 Stat. at 2325; see also H.RL REP. No. 96-1418 (stating that the bill's
primary concern is "individuals for whom cost may be a deterrent to vindicating their rights");
126 CONG. REc. H28654 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Baldus); 125 CONG. REC.
S21,444 (1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at S21,443 (statement of Sen. Nelson); id. at
S21,435-36 (statement of Sen. Culver); id. at S21,435 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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decreased costs, small entities would be more inclined to vindicate
their rights by resisting excessive regulation.27 Congress believed that
a fee-shifting statute also would deter excessive regulation by
increasing the government's administrative costs associated with
such regulation. 28 Congress believed that the prospect of paying a
prevailing adversary's attorneys' fees would substantially inhibit
administrative agencies from instituting excessive regulation.
29
B. Fee-Shifting Under the EAJA
1. Types of Fee-Shifting
In the event that the government subjects parties 30 to unjustified
governmental conduct,3' the EAJA permits such parties to recover
from the federal government32 reasonable attorneys' fees incurred
while litigating against the government.33 The EAJA provides for
three types of fee-shifting. The EAJA's first fee-shifting provision,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b),34 subjects the federal government to any form of
27. See § 202, 94 Stat. at 2325.
28. Under the EAJA, successful EAJA petitioners receive their attorneys' fees directly
from the government agency responsible for the petitioners' grievances. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(dX4) (1994). Thus, Congress believed that government agencies, motivated by a desire
to stay within their operating budgets, would have an incentive to avoid issuing the undesirable
type of regulation that could generate EAJA liability. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the
Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable Government
Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 225 (1994).
29. Congress believed that administrative agencies should "have to pay for their
overegulatory mistakes themselves ... [a]nd [that] with this in mind perhaps the agencies
[would] make fewer such mistakes." See 126 CONG. REC. H28653 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980)
(statement of Rep. Heckler); id. at H28650 (statement of Sen. Smith); 125 CONG. REC. S21,444
(1979) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at S21,443 (statement of Sen. Nelson); id. at S21,441
(statement of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 821,436 (statement of Sen. Dole).
30. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes for the requisite criteria of an
EAJA-eligible party.
31. See discussion infra note 38 for an explanation of the standard for governmental
conduct.
32. By allowing for a cause of action against the federal government, the EAJA implicitly
provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. As a result of this waiver, the Supreme
Court has held that all of the EAJA's provisions must be strictly construed in the government's
favor. See Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991); see
also Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1076 (5th Cir. 1992).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(3).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) provides in relevant part- "The United States shall be liable for
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fee-shifting that was previously available against any other party at
common law.35  The second fee-shifting provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d), provides for a form of fee-shifting which was previously
unavailable at common law.36 Under § 2412(d), courts must award
attorneys' fees to any party that prevails in a civil action (other than
one sounding in tort) against the United States in which the
government's position37  lacked substantial justification.38  The
EAJA's third fee-shifting provision, 5 U.S.C. § 504, sanctions legal
expenses for a prevailing party in any administrative agency
adversary adjudication.39 Like § 2412(d), recovery of fees under
§ 504 requires that the government's position in the underlying
litigation lacked substantial justification.
such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the
common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award."
Id.
35. See supra note 3 for a summary of fee-shifting provisions available at common law.
36. See Sisk, supra note 28, at 229-31.
37. The "position" of the United States includes not only the position taken by the United
States in the underlying civil action, but also the action (or lack thereof) taken by the agency for
which the petitioner originally brought the civil action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). Prior to the
EAJA amendment clarifying the phrase "government's position," several courts had held that
this phrase referred only to the government's position in litigation. See Ashbum v. United
States, 740 F.2d 843, 849 (11th Cir. 1984); Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1115 (2d Cir.
1984); White v. United States, 740 F.2d 836, 842 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 2,116
Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 716 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Spencer v.
NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ellis v. United States, 711 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); Tyler Bus. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1982).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA states a vague standard of governmental
conduct as the basis for EAJA fee-shifting. The EAJA states that before a court can award
attorneys' fees to a party, the court must find that the government's conduct was not
"substantially justified." Id. The EAJA contains neither a formal definition nor commentary
explaining this phrase. As a result, courts have struggled to interpret this phrase through the
EAJA's legislative history and various canons of statutory construction. See Gregory C. Sisk,
The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA. L. REv. 1, 18-24 (1995). The Supreme
Court most recently has declared that the government's conduct is substantially justified if it
possesses a "reasonable basis both in law and fact." Id. at 22 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). EAJA commentators have noted that the government's burden of
proving that its conduct was substantially justified suggests that "Congress intended the EAJA
as a compromise between always shifting and never shifting a prevailing party's fees to the
government." ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 666 (1989).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1994).
40. See id. § 504(a)(1).
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2. Eligibility for Fee-shifting
The EAJA's three fee-shifting provisions are available only to
parties that satisfy the EAJA's eligibility criteria. To qualify as an
eligible party under the EAJA, a party must (i) incur legal expenses;41
(ii) prevail in the litigation underlying the party's petition for fees;42
(iii) allege that the government's position in the underlying litigation
was not substantially justified; and (iv), with limited exceptions,4 3
possess a net worth4 of less than $7 million if the petitioning party is
a business,45 or less than $2 million if the petitioning party is an
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX)(XA) (courts shall award "to a prevailing party... fees...
[that have been] incurred by that party") (emphasis added). For a comprehensive analysis of
this statutory requirement, see Sisk, supra note 29, at 341-60.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dXl)(B).
43. Congress has exempted two types of parties from the EAJA's net worth ceiling:
[A]n organization described in section 50l(cX3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(26 U.S.C. § 501(cX3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a
cooperative association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act
(12 U.S.C. § 1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization
or cooperative association or for purposes of subsection (d)(l)(D), a small entity as
defined in section 601 ofTitle 5.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(dX2)(B) (West Supp. 1997). For a discussion of the rationale behind the
agricultural cooperative exemption and how this rationale illuminates Congress's intention with
respect to the net worth qualifications of EAJA-petitioning trade associations, see infra note
115 and accompanying text.
44. Most courts can readily establish the net worth of a business or an individual by
examining an informal balance sheet prepared by the EAJA petitioner. See Sisk, supra note 28,
at 303-04. Sisk notes that requiring businesses to submit an itemized balance sheet to the court
is a legitimate requirement in light of the EAJA's requirement that the petitioner submit an
application to the court showing that the petitioner is entitled to a fee award. See id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2412(dXI)(B)). Sisk also notes, however, two reasons why a more relaxed net worth
assessment requirement is appropriate for individuals. First, an informal net worth assessment is
appropriate for individuals because very few individual petitioners possess a $2 million net
worth. See id. Second, should an informal assessment reveal any doubts as to a petitioner's net
worth eligibility, the Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in
Agency Proceedings, 1 C.F.R. § 315.202(a) (1994), suggest that the adjudicator may "require
an applicant to file additional information to determine its eligibility for an award." Sisk, supra
note 28, at 304-05.
45. The EAJA does not use the term "business" to classify those parties whose net worth
may not exceed $7 million. Rather, § 2412(d)(2)(B) divides the net worth criteria according to
"individual" status and status as "any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership,
corporation, association, unit of local government or organization." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2412(dX2)(B).
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individual.46 Once the petitioning party has satisfied these criteria,47
the EAJA mandates a fee award unless the government can prove that
its position was substantially justified, or that "special
circumstances '48 exist that would render an award of attorneys' fees
unjust.49
III. MIXED ELIGIBILITY PROBLEMS UNDER THE EAJA
A. Underlying Litigation Involving both EAJA-Eligible and EAJA-
Ineligible Parties
When several parties have jointly litigated against the federal
government, evaluating a subsequent EAJA petition may pose a
considerable challenge for courts. In the event that the government's
adversaries consisted of both EAJA-eligible and EAJA-ineligible
parties,50 a subsequent petition for fees by any eligible party would
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(B) governs a party's EAJA eligibility with respect to net
worth. Specifically, the subsection provides that:
[P]arty means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the
time the civil action was filed, or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any
partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net
worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed,...
except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 ... exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a
cooperative association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act.
. may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization or cooperative
association or for purposes of subsection (d)(1)(D), a small entity as defined in section
601 of Title 5.
IL
In addition to stating the EAJA's net worth criteria, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) also
limits EAJA eligibility by specifying the maximum number of people that an EAJA-eligible
business may employ. See id. Although this criterion is capable of producing the same mixed
eligibility problems as the EAJA's net worth criteria, this Note does not address the potential
for EAJA eligibility problems arising out of the EAJA's employment criteria.
47. In addition to the aforementioned substantive criteria, a party seeking an EAJA fee
award must, within thirty days of the final judgment in the underlying litigation, submit to the
court an application for a fee award setting forth the party's eligibility for receiving such an
award. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(B).
48. See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the EAJA's "special circumstances" clause
and how this clause may affect a party's EAJA eligibility.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
50. This Note does not explore the eligibility problems that maybe posed by a group of
individually eligible litigants whose net worth in the aggregate exceeds the EAJA's net worth
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suggest that the party bore the burden of some of the group's
litigation costs.51 Despite this suggestion, several courts have (1)
questioned whether the petitioning party actually incurred any
expenses,52  or (2) have assumed that the petitioner did incur
expenses, but nonetheless questioned the propriety of its petition
based on the belief that EAJA-ineligible parties have a duty to absorb
litigation costs that might otherwise be borne by an EAJA-eligible
party.5 3 Courts and commentators call the former eligibility inquiry
the "real party in interest" approach to the mixed eligibility
problem.54 Courts and commentators call the latter eligibility inquiry
the "special circumstances" 55 approach to the mixed eligibility
problem.56
1. The Real Party in Interest Approach
In Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,57
three illegal aliens and the Unification Church jointly brought suit
against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to overturn
ceiling.
51. Because the EAJA requires that a fee petitioner incur legal expenses, an eligible
party's petition implies that it funded a portion of the underlying litigation costs.
52. See, e.g., Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
53. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988).
54. The real party in interest doctrine has a substantial history. At common law, a suit
could only be brought in the name of the person who had legal title to the right of action. See
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 490 (5th ed. 1994). Courts deemed that person the
real party in interest. See id. In 1973, however, Congress revised the common law notion of the
real party in interest doctrine by enacting FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Under Rule 17(a), the real party
in interest not only may be the person who ultimately will benefit from the litigation, but also
the party who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced, such as executors,
administrators, and various other representatives. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). For a general
discussion of the evolution of Rule 17(a), see WRIGHT, supra, at 490-93 (5th ed. 1994); see also
Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Sisk, supra note 28, at 342-47.
55. See discussion infra Part M.A.2.
56. See Sisk, supra note 38, at 93-105; see also James B. Nobile, Note, Determining Fees
for Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act: Accomplishing the Act's Goals, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1091, 1099 n.37 (1988); Niki Kuckes, Note, Reenacting the Equal Access to Justice Act:
A Proposal for Automatic Attorney's Fee Awards, 94 YALE L.J. 1207, 1212-13 (1985); cf.
Grason Eloc. Co. v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1103-05 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing several
variations of the special circumstances approach).
57. 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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the INS's decision to deport the aliens.58 After prevailing in the
litigation, the plaintiffs petitioned for an EAJA award of attorneys'
fees.59 The three individuals argued that because they were each
eligible parties under the EAJA, they were eligible for fees under the
EAJA.60 Upon reviewing an affidavit by the individuals' counsel,
however, the district court determined that the individuals' legal fees
were fully funded by their co-plaintiff, the Church.6t Consequently,
the district court refused to award EAJA attorneys' fees, holding that
the Church was the only real party in interest with respect to fees.62
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held that
when an arrangement for attorneys' fees among multiple plaintiffs is
such that only some of the plaintiffs will be liable for attorneys' fees,
the court shall consider the EAJA eligibility of only those EAJA
petitioners who will be liable for attorneys' fees if the court denies
the petition for an EAJA fee award.63 The court reasoned that while
the district court's use of the real party in interest doctrine was
unusual for a case involving attorneys' fees, 64 it was appropriate for
carrying out the congressional intent underlying the EAJA.65
58. See id. at 1079.
59. See id
60. See id. at 1081.
61. See id at 1082.
62. Seeid. at 1081.
63. See id. at 1082.
64. See id. at 1081. The court in Unification Church qualified this statement by citing
National Treasury Employees Union v. Department of the Treasury, 656 F.2d 848, 850-51
(D.C. Cir. 1981), which held that, under the Privacy Act, an award of attorneys' fees to a
union's outside counsel is inappropriate when the union and counsel have agreed in advance
that the union is the real party in interest with respect to such fees. See Unification Church, 762
F.2d at 1082-83.
65. See Unification Church, 762 F.2d at 1082. The D.C. Circuit amplified its Unification
Church holding four years later in American Ass 'n of Retired Persons (AARP) v. EEOC, 873
F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In AARP, three plaintiffs consolidated their claims and successfully
sued the EEOC. See i. at 403. Thereafter, two of the three plaintiffs, Nella S. Gent and the
Older Women's League (OWL), petitioned for attorneys' fees under the EAJA. See id. The
district court referred the petition to a magistrate judge who found that AARP, which did not
petition for fees, had played the dominant role in the litigation and had been the only plaintiff
that incurred legal fees. See id. The magistrate concluded as a matter of law that because AARP
was the only party to have incurred legal fees, and because AARP had not proven its eligibility
for EAJA attorneys' fees, Gent and OWL did not qualify for fees. See id.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the magistrate's order and held that under Unification Church,
there may be multiple real parties in interest. See id. at 406. The court distinguished Unification
Church as a case involving a clear arrangement among multiple plaintiffs that one plaintiff
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2. The Special Circumstances Approach
In addition to the real party in interest approach, courts have used
the EAJA's "special circumstances" clause66 to address the mixed
eligibility problem. In Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee,67 Louisiana and
five environmental groups successfully sued the United States Army
Corps of Engineers for violating the National Environmental Policy
Act 68 (NEPA). 69 The plaintiffs, with the exception of Louisiana,
subsequently sought an award of EAJA attorneys' fees. 70  The
government opposed the plaintiffs' EAJA petition based on
would fund the litigation. See id. at 405. The court also set forth four factors for courts to
consider when deciding whether there are multiple real parties in interest. See id. at 405-06.
These factors include: (1) whether there is one counsel representing a number of plaintiffs of
various sizes or wealth; (2) whether there is one counsel of record for each plaintiff and the
duration which that attorney has been counsel for the particular plaintiff; (3) whether the
various attorneys made appearances and representations on behalf of their respective clients;
and (4) whether any plaintiffs retained pro bono or legal aid society counsel. See id.
The court in United States v. Lakeshore Terminal and Pipeline Co., 639 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.
Mich. 1986), also approached the net worth issue in light of the real party in interest doctrine. In
Lakeshore, the United States sued Lakeshore Terminal and Pipeline Co. for a declaratory
judgment that would entitle the government to possession of a petroleum facility. See id. at 959.
The district court found for the defendant, who in turn petitioned the court for attorneys' fees
pursuant to the EAJA. See id. The court found that the defendant was an ineligible party under
the EAJA and denied the defendant's petition. See id. at 962. The court held that the
defendant's parent company was the real party in interest. The court based its decision on
several factors that tended to show that the parent company controlled, and would directly
benefit from, the litigation. See id.
For an application of the real party in interest approach in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding, see In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136 at 1144-45 n.18 (11th Cir. 1990) (opining that in an
adversary proceeding against the federal government, the creditors, rather than the debtor, are
the "real party in interest," and, thus, a trustee's petition for EAJA fees should be evaluated
according to the qualifications of the creditors).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1XA) allows courts to render ineligible a party that is otherwise
eligible for an EAJA award whenever there are special circumstances that would make an
EAJA award unjust. See, e.g., Oguachuba v. Immigration and Nationalization Serv., 706 F.2d
93, 94 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a flagrant contempt for United States law and a decision not
to acquiesce in deportation constitutes a "special eircumstance" contemplated by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(dX1XA)). But see, Grason Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1103-05 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the EAJA's legislative history reflects no intention to classify a party's financial
status as a "special circumstance" capable of defeating an EAJA award).
67. 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
69. See Guste, 853 F.2d at 1220-21. The plaintiffs argued that the Corps violated NEPA
by not completing an environmental impact statement before renewing six permits for shell
dredging along the Gulf coast and coastal lakes of Louisiana. See id.
70. Seeid.at1221.
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Louisiana's participation in the litigation.71 The government argued
that because the six plaintiffs possessed the same goal of enforcing
NEPA, Louisiana's strong financial position and presence in the
litigation created a special circumstance, obligating Louisiana to bear
the cost of the litigation.72 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
government and held that an EAJA-eligible party may not take a
"free ride through the judicial process"' 73 at the government's expense
if an EAJA-ineligible party is able to prosecute the federal
government at that party's own expense. 74
B. A Variation on the Mixed Eligibility Problem: Litigation Involving
an EAJA-Eligible Party Who Represents the Interests of EAJA-
Ineligible Parties
Within the context of the mixed eligibility problem, there is a
more subtle EAJA eligibility issue. Occasionally, a single EAJA-
eligible party will initiate litigation against the government that is
clearly in the interest of EAJA-ineligible parties. This situation may
arise when trade associations litigate against the government on
71. Seeid. at1223.
72. See id. The United States analogized the case at bar to Sierra Club v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 776 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1985). See Guste, 853 F.2d at 1223. The
United States then urged the Guste court to adopt Judge Meskill's reasoning in the Sierra
dissent:
The EAJA was passed for a specific purpose: to ensure that parties would not be
prevented from contesting government action simply because they could not afford to
litigate the matter.... When a group of twelve plaintiffs, one of whom has a net worth
of over $1 million, join together, congressional concern about access to the courts is
not implicated. Indeed, it seems incongruous to hold that if the ineligible plaintiff
alone challenged [the government], fees could not be awarded under the EAJA, but
because the ineligible plaintiff was joined by less wealthy friends, fees may be
awarded.
Id at 1223-24 (quoting Sierra, 776 F.2d at 394).
73. Guste, 853 F.2d at 1225. An individual gains a "free ride" when it benefits from the
litigation regardless of whether it bears the cost of such litigation. See Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d
1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991).
74. See Guste, 853 F.2d at 1225. The Guste court then related the free-rider problem at bar
to the economic deficiency associated with indemnity when there is a failure to consolidate the
overlapping claims of multiple parties into a class action. See id. For a discussion of these free-
rider inefficiencies as they relate to consolidation of claims, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 537-38 (3d ed. 1986).
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behalf of their EAJA-ineligible members.75 The three circuit courts of
appeals that have confronted this issue have proceeded in one of two
ways. Two circuits have held that the EAJA specifically permits trade
associations to recover fees, and, thus, the EAJA ineligibility of an
association's members has no bearing on the eligibility of the
association itself.76 In contrast, another circuit has rejected the EAJA
petition of an otherwise eligible trade association comprised of
EAJA-ineligible members, holding that Congress intended for the
EAJA to benefit only those litigants that could not otherwise gain
access to the courts.7 7
1. The Trade Association as a Whole: the Ninth and Fifth Circuits
In Love v. Reilly,78 the Ninth Circuit held that a trade association's
individually ineligible members will not preclude that association
from qualifying for attorneys' fees under the EAJA.79 In Love,
Northwest Food Processors Association (NWFPA) petitioned for an
EAJA award after successfully obtaining an injunction against the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), preventing the EPA from
banning a particular pesticide.80 The government appealed the district
court's finding that NWFPA was an eligible party under the EAJA.81
The government alleged that NWFPA's members, not NWFPA
itself, stood to gain from the original civil action, and, thus, according
to Unification Church,2 NWFPA was not the real party in interest
with respect to an EAJA award.83 The government further argued that
75. Over twenty-two thousand trade associations are registered with the United States
Chamber of Commerce. See National Truck Equip. Ass'n v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 972 F.2d 669, 672 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992). Businesses that join these associations possess
two overriding interests: preserving their financial vitality and promoting their collective
interests. See generally International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement
Workers of America v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274,289-90 (1986).
76. See Texas Food Indus. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 81 F.3d 578 (5th Cir.
1996); Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991).
77. See National Truck Equip. Ass'n v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 972
F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1992).
78. 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991).
79. See id. at 1494.
80. See id. at 1493.
81. See id. at 1493-94.
82. 762 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
83. See Love, 924 F.2d at 1494.
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because NWFPA's members were the real parties in interest, the
court should only consider the qualifications of NWFPA's
members.84  The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's
characterization of the Unification Church holding and stated that,
according to Unification Church, the real party in interest with
respect to an EAJA fee award is the party who incurred the costs of
the civil action, regardless of whether that party had a right to bring a
claim in the underlying civil action.85 The court reasoned that,
because NWFPA had incurred attorneys' fees and because the
EAJA's plain language does not specifically require a court to
consider the net worth of an association's members, NWFPA could
recover its attorneys' fees. 6
In Texas Food Industry Ass'n v. United States Department of
Agriculture,87 the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in holding
that a trade association's EAJA-ineligible members would not
preclude the association from recovering EAJA attorneys' fees.88 In
Texas Food, National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association
(NAWGA) petitioned for an EAJA fee award after prevailing in an
84. See id. The government further alleged that there was a free-rider problem. See id. at
1495. The government first contended that some of the plaintiffs were potentially EAJA-
ineligible parties. See id. The government then claimed that all of the plaintiffs were
represented by the same counsel. See id. The government further alleged that the eligible
plaintiffs would use an EAJA fee award to fund the ineligible plaintiffs' legal fees, and that the
potential for such a scenario constituted a special circumstance that would render an award of
fees unjust. See id.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's reasoning. See id. The court first noted that the
government failed to prove that any of the association's members were individually ineligible
under the EAJA. See id. The court then noted that the government had failed to show that the
other two plaintiffs were not liable for attorneys' fees. See id. Thus, while the court did not
condemn the government's free-rider defense, it held the defense to a high level ofserutiny.
85. See id. The court also rejected the government's analogy to United States v. Lakeshore
Terminal and Pipeline Co., 639 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that the defendant was
ineligible for an EAJA award because the defendant's parent company controlled, and would
directly benefit from, the litigation). See Love, 924 F.2d at 1494 n.1. The court noted that the
Lakeshore court confined its application of the real party in interest doctrine to the context of
piercing the corporate veil. See id.; see also supra note 65 (discussing the Lakeshore court's
analysis). The Ninth Circuit then noted that, unlike the Lakeshore case, the government had not
alleged that the interests of NWFPA and NWFPA's members overlapped in the underlying
litigation. See Love, 924 F.2d at 1494 n.1.
86. See Love, 924 F.2d at 1494.
87. 81 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996).
88. See id. at 582.
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action to delay the Department of Agriculture from implementing a
rule governing meat packaging standards. 89 The district court found
that NAWGA was eligible for an EAJA fee award and approved
NAWGA's EAJA petition.90
On appeal, the government argued that both the EAJA's statutory
language and Congress's post-enactment explanations of the
EAJA9' clearly indicated Congress's intention that courts consider
the EAJA eligibility of trade associations' individual members when
assessing the EAJA eligibility of trade associations.93 The Texas
89. See id. at 579. NAWGA demonstrated that the government had failed to comply with
the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1994). See Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 579. Shortly after the underlying judgment was rendered,
the Department of Agriculture reissued an identical rule in compliance with the APA's notice
and comment requirements. See id.
90. See id. at 580. The district court found that NAWGA was eligible for EAJA attorneys'
fees based on, inter alia, NAWGA's net worth of $3.3 million.
91. The government cited 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1994) (current version at 28
U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(BXii) (West Supp. 1997)). See Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 581. For a
discussion of the government's ineligibility argument based upon the plain language of 28
U.S.C. § 2412(dX2)(BXii) (amended 1997), see infra note 93.
92. The government cited the post-enactment testimony of Senator DeConcini, a leading
sponsor of the EAJA:
In the West, and I suspect in other parts of the country, small farmers often band
together to form agricultural cooperatives. They have often been considered as a unit
particularly in determining their assets for insurance and borrowing purposes. Such
aggregate treatment would cause the whole cooperative to exceed the [then] $5 million
limitation.
Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 581 n.3 (citing Reauthorization of the Equal Access to Justice Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 17 (1983) (testimony of Sen. DeConcini)).
93. In support of its position, the government pointed to the EAJA's net worth exemption
for several specified businesses. See i. at 581 (citing the net worth exemption for agricultural
cooperatives and certain non-profit businesses, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii)
(amended 1997)). From these enumerated exemptions and the statutory canon "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius" ("the expression of one thing is to the exclusion of the other"), the
government asserted that Congress intended that courts aggregate the net worth of the members
of all other types of businesses not specified, such as NAWGA. See id. For a discussion and
criticism of this argument, see infra note 115 and accompanying text. The government then
argued that, based on public policy, the association should be ineligible for fees under 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (dX2)(BXii) because the provision implicitly requires aggregation of the net
worth and size of a trade association's individual members when the association is representing
primarily the members' interest in litigation. See Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 582.
The government further argued that, pursuant to State of Louisiana ex. rel. Guste v. Lee, the
presence of ineligible parties in the litigation, NAWGA's members, was a special circumstance
that would render unjust an award of fees to an otherwise eligible association. See id. at 582 n.7.
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Food court found that the EAJA's plain language did not support the
government's position with respect to the EAJA's criteria for
determining the eligibility of trade associations. 94 In the absence of
such support for the government's position, the court refused to
accept the government's arguments based on the EAJA's plain
language and post-enactment explanations.95 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that, pursuant to the
EAJA's plain language, NAWGA qualified for an award of
attorneys' fees. 96
2. The Trade Association as the Sum of its Parts: The Sixth
Circuit
In National Truck Equipment Ass 'n v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration,97 the Sixth Circuit held that courts should
consider the net worth of each member of a trade association when
evaluating whether the association itself is entitled to an EAJA fee
award. 98 In National, National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA)
petitioned for an EAJA award after obtaining judicial review of an
administrative order that set steering-wheel safety standards. 99 A
Special Master denied NTEA's EAJA petition based on the fact that
the government's position was substantially justified.1° On appeal,
Like the Ninth Circuit, however, the court in Texas Food criticized the government for
inappropriately applying a "mixed eligibility" test. See id. The court in Texas Food also pointed
out that Guste's special circumstances test only applies to suits prosecuted by multiple parties,
some of which are EAJA-eligible and some of which are EAJA-ineligible. See Id. Because
NAWGA's members were not co-plaintiffs in the underlying action, the court refused to
employ Guste's special circumstances test. See id.
94. See Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 581. The court in Texas Food cited the "clear and
unambiguous" eligibility criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). See TexasFood, 81 F.3d at 581.
95. See Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 582. In summing up its analytical approach to the
government's statutory construction argument, the court in Texas Food stated that the "inquiry
into the applicability of [the EAJA] must begin and must end with [the EAJA's] clear and
unambiguous words ... " Id.
96. See id.
97. 972 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1992).
98. See id. at 674.
99. See id. at 670. Compliance with the proposed safety standards would have required
NTEA's members either to obtain special manufacturer certifications or to devise safety and
crash tests to ensure its members' adherence to the standards. NTEA argued that neither of
these alternatives would have been financially feasible for its members. See id.
100. See id. at 670-71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which immunizes the government
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the Sixth Circuit disregarded the Special Master's finding that the
government's position had been substantially justified.10' Instead, the
court addressed the government's allegation that NTEA included
EAJA-ineligible parties and, thus, was ineligible for an EAJA
award. 10 2 Contrary to the findings of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the
Sixth Circuit found that the EAJA's plain language implies that
courts generally should consider the individual net worth of the
members of an association when evaluating the EAJA eligibility of
an association.1
0 3
The National court observed that the EAJA grants certain
organizations an exemption from the EAJA's net worth eligibility
criteria.'0 4 From this observation, the court reasoned that Congress
intended for courts to consider the EAJA eligibility of each member
of all types of organizations that are not specifically exempted from
the EAJA's net worth eligibility criteria.0 5 The National court found
further support for its holding in the EAJA's legislative history.10 6 In
particular, the court drew support from the Model Rules of
Administrative Agency Proceedings. 0 7 The court noted that the
from EAJA liability in the event that its position is substantially justified). Although the Special
Master based its decision on the fact that the government's position was substantially justified,
the Special Master noted that the qualifications of the association's members were irrelevant for
the purpose of awarding EAJA fees. See id. at 670.
101. See id. at 669. Note, however, that the National court did not expressly disagree with
the Special Master's finding regarding substantial justification.
102. See National, 972 F.2d at 671-74.
103. Seeid.at674.
104. See id. at 673 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988)).
105. See id. The National court employed the reasoning advocated by the government in
Texas Food. See id.; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the
government's legal position in Teas Food and the court's response to the government's
position). The National court also applied the statutory canon, "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius," to 5 U.S.C. § 501(cX3) and concluded that Congress intended for courts to consider
the EAJA eligibility of the members of all business associations not specifically exempted from
the net worth criteria contained within § 501(c)(3). See National, 972 F.2d at 674. For a critique
of the National court's reasoning with respect to the latter point, see infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
106. See National, 972 F.2d at 673. The court proceeded from the premise that Congress
intended that '"EAJA awards should be available where the burden of attorneys' fees would
have deterred the litigation challenging the government's actions, but not where no such
deterrence exists."' Id. at 672 (quoting SEC v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1415-16 (8th
Cir. 1990)).
107. See id. at 672-73. The Model Rules were promulgated in 1981 and govern EAJA
awards in administrative agency proceedings. See id. at 672. The National court cited Model
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commentary to Model Rule 0.104(g) specifically addressed the
potential for EAJA eligibility concerns in the context of a petitioning
trade association. 0 8 The court also noted the commentary's
suggestion that the qualifications of a trade association's members
may be relevant when the association is litigating primarily on behalf
of its members.t0 9 In light of the Model Rules, their commentary, and
the EAJA's statutory language, the court denied NTEA's EAJA
petition. 10
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING
THE EAJA ELIGIBILITY OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
A. The Plain Language Arguments
The Love and Texas Food courts justifiably relied on the EAJA's
plain language as support for their holdings. The EAJA's plain
Rule 0.104(f), which requires that when the interests of an EAJA petitioner are closely aligned
with other parties, agencies should look beyond the EAJA eligibility of the EAJA petitioner
"The net worth ... of the applicant and all of its affiliates shall be aggregated to determine
eligibility." 46 Fed. Reg., 32,900, 32,912 (1981), quoted in National, 972 F.2d at 672. The
Sixth Circuit amplified this point by noting the commentary to Model Rule 0.104(0: "'The
intent of Congress in passing the [EAJA] was to aid truly small entities rather than those that
are part of larger groups of affiliated firms .... .- National, 972 F.2d at 672 (quoting
Administrative Conference of the United States, Equal Access to Justice Act: Agency
Implementation, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900,32,903 (1981)).
The National court next cited Model Rule 0.104(g). See National, 972 F.2d at 672. Model
Rule 0.104(g) provides that EAJA-eligible applicants that litigate primarily on behalf of
ineligible applicants are not eligible for an EAJA fee award: 'An applicant that participates in
a proceeding primarily on behalf of one or more other persons or entities that would be
ineligible is not itself eligible for an award."' See National, 972 F.2d at 672 (quoting Model
Rules, 46 Fed. Reg. at 32,912 (1981)).
108. See National, 972 F.2d at 672.
109. See id. The commentary to Model Rule 0.104(g) provides:
[Tirade associations may sometimes become involved in litigation on their own
account (e.g., as employers) as well as in the interests of their membership. On
reflection, we believe the best way of handling this situation is through the provision
on participation on behalf of others. When a proceeding involves a trade association
independent of its membership, the association's eligibility should be measured
individually, like any other applicant's; when an association is representing primarily
the interests of its members, the agency can examine the facts of the particular
situation.
Model Rules, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900,32,903 (1981).
110. See National, 972 F.2d at 674.
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language strongly suggests that courts should assess the EAJA
eligibility of an association without regard to its members' individual
qualifications."' The EAJA's subsection that governs a party's
eligibility status lists several types of potentially eligible business
entities, including any "association... the net worth of which did not
exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed .. . 12
Congress had the option of specifying further net worth restrictions
on associations' EAJA eligibility, but chose not to include such
restrictions."13
The National court failed in its attempt to rebut the Love and
Texas Food courts' interpretations of the EAJA's statutory language.
The National court highlighted the EAJA's net worth exclusion for
agricultural cooperatives and inferred from that exclusion that the
EAJA eligibility of all other associations must depend on their
members' individual eligibility." 4 This inferential chain lacks a
necessary premise. By itself, the EAJA's exemption of certain types
of associations from its net worth ceiling says at most that all other
types of associations not specified are not exempt from the net worth
ceiling. Contrary to the National court's inference, the EAJA does
not suggest that each member of an association should be evaluated
individually for EAJA eligibility. The National court's inference
might be more compelling if the EAJA further specified the way in
which courts should treat the net worth of each member of
agricultural cooperatives. In fact, however, the agricultural
cooperative exemption is silent as to whether courts should consider
I 11. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(dX2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1997) (stating the EAJA eligibility
criteria for trade associations, but omitting any consideration of associations' members).
112. Id.
113. The court in Texas Food aptly acknowledged this point:
Congress surely understood that "associations" are made up of constituent members,
some more wealthy and larger than others, yet who have joined together to further a
common business purpose. It is not implausible that Congress would think it
appropriate to treat associations qua associations instead of atomizing the body politic
of each association, then inspecting and distinguishing each component member to
determine whether each is individually eligible.
Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 582. This excerpt from the Texas Food opinion offers compelling
support for the argument that the EAJA's plain language does not require courts to look beyond
the EAJA eligibility of an association.
114. See National, 972 F.2d at 673-74.
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the net worth of each member of an agricultural cooperative.' 
5
115. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (omitting any mention of an associations'
membership). Although the EAJA does not specify whether, or how, courts should consider the
net worth of each member of an agricultural cooperative, the EAJA's legislative history
strongly suggests that Congress contemplated that courts would in fact consider the
membership of such associations and would disqualify such associations in the event that the
aggregate net worth of such associations' members exceeds $7 million. Most notable in this
respect are Senator Hayakawa's statements, which he made while proposing an EAJA
amendment that culminated in the net worth exclusion for agricultural cooperatives:
My amendment would allow agriculture cooperatives whose net worth may exceed
$[7] million to qualify for reimbursements under this act without regard to net worth.
The reason is as follows:
While [the EAJA's] definition of corporations[, associations,] or organizations [as
EAJA parties] appears to work effectively for most groups, it fails to take into
consideration the basic characteristic of agricultural cooperatives. Agricultural
cooperatives generally operate at cost with respect to their dealings with
member/patrons. These members are growers who are not simply investors or
stockholders but are participants in the business. All benefits and risks assumed by the
cooperative are shared equitably by each of the grower-members. The net worth of the
cooperative as an entity is not significant for the purpose of the [EAJA's] definition [of
a "party"].
125 CONG. REc. S10,918 (daily ed. July 31, 1979) (statement of Sen. Hayakawa). Senator
Hayakawa's statement is notable because it implies that members of Congress believed that the
financial status of associations' individual members normally should be emphasized in the
context of net worth calculation. Senator Hayakawa conveyed this point by characterizing an
agricultural cooperative's exclusive raison d'tre as serving the interests of its members, and by
stating that the net worth of a cooperative as an entity, rather than as an aggregation of its
individual members, is insignificant forthe purpose of calculating a cooperative's net worth.
Moreover, Senator Thurmond's statement in approval of Senator Hayakawa's proposed
amendment demonstrates that members of Congress believed that courts would consider the
membership of EAJA-petitioning businesses:
Proceedings are usually brought against the members [of agricultural cooperatives]
collectively in the name of the particular cooperative to which they belong; and as a
group, they would undoubtedly exceed the $[7],000,000 net worth limitation for
associations or organizations .... [T]he great majority of these farmers would qualify
under the [EAJA's] [then] current $1,000,000 net worth limitation for individuals.
125 CONG. REc. S10,918 (daily ed. July 31, 1979) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (emphasis
added). In addition to showing that members of Congress believed that courts should consider
the EAJA qualifications of associations' members, Senator Thurmond's comments make a far
more profound suggestion. His comments suggest that not only are the individual members'
eligibility criteria relevant, but also that their net worth should be aggregated "as a group" to
determine an association's EAJA eligibility. See id. This implicit aggregation requirement poses
a much greater barrier to EAJA eligibility because, theoretically, an association comprised
strictly of EAJA-eligible parties could be rendered ineligible by the sheer number of its
members whose net worths aggregate in excess of the $7 million limit.
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B. The Congressional Intent Arguments
As a general rule, in the face of clear and unambiguous statutory
language, most courts will not resort to evidence of congressional
intent when interpreting a statute. 116 However, when the application
of a statute's plain language leads to an unreasonable result,
determining, and adhering to, congressional intent may nonetheless
be warranted.
117
Abiding by the EAJA's plain language, the court in Texas Food
awarded attorneys' fees to an association that consisted of multi-
billion dollar corporations" 8 and that had litigated against the
government solely for the benefit of those corporations 1 9  iS
outcome, while consistent with the EAJA's plain language, 120 is
nonetheless inconsistent with the purposes of the EAJA. 121 Congress
intended for the EAJA to alleviate the financial concerns of "small
business owners"' 122 and those individuals "for whom cost may be a
deterrent to vindicating their rights."' l Congress did not intend for a
corporation with $13 billion in assets, or any of its billion-dollar
associates, to recover through the representation of its trade
association' 24 attorneys' fees that it could not recover under the
116. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04 (5th
ed. 1992).
117. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). The
Supreme Court has recognized that when strict adherence to the words of a statute "[leads] to
absurd or futile results," the Court should "look[: beyond the words to the purpose of the act."
Id. Even "when the plain meaning [does] not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,"' the Court should
"follow[] the purpose, rather than the literal words." Id.; see also Samuels, Kramer & Co. v.
Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 980-82 (2d Cir. 1991) (modifying the words of a statute to agree
with inconsistent legislative intent); Rod Warren Ink v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 325, 326 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating that courts may look beyond a statute's clear meaning in cases of contrary
congressional intent). Moreover, courts are presently showing a trend in favor of considering
legislative intent as a primary source of statutory interpretation in addition to a statute's plain
language. See SINGER, supra note 116, § 46.07.
118. See Texas Food, 81 F.3d 578,582 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. Seeid.
120. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994), as amended by Act of Dec. 17, 1997, 28
U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West Supp. 1997).
121. See supra Part II.A.
122. Seesupra note25.
123. See supra note 25.
124. One way in which EAJA-ineligible members of a trade association may indirectly
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EAJA.
In light of the fact that the decisions in Love and Texas Food
resulted in EAJA awards that conflicted with congressional intent, it
is not surprising that neither the Love court nor the Texas Food court
faithfully addressed the government's legislative intent arguments.12
The Love court, perhaps cognizant of the inconsistency between its
holding and the congressional intent underlying the EAJA, failed to
broach in any way the issue of congressional intent. 126 Similarly, the
court in Texas Food purported to recognize the issue of congressional
intent, but effectively ignored it: "The [EAJA's] purpose, by its plain
language, is to make associations eligible for an award on the basis of
each association's independent qualifications.' 27 As this statement
suggests, the court attempted to parlay its strong plain language
rationale into a congressional intent rationale by discerning
congressional intent from the plain language of the EAJA rather than
from the EAJA's legislative history.
In contrast to the Love and Texas Food courts' failure to address
the issue of congressional intent regarding EAJA eligibility, the
National court fully addressed the issue of who Congress intended to
benefit under the EAJA.
28
C Superiority of the National Holding
Although the National court effectively disregarded the EAJA's
plain language, 129 it nonetheless reached the proper decision. The
National court failed to establish that the EAJA's net worth
exclusions imply anything about whether courts should evaluate the
EAJA eligibility of associations' members. 30 However, this failure
does not detract from the fact that there is abundant evidence
supporting the National court's central proposition. Despite the Texas
benefit from an EAJA award to their association is through the lower membership dues that
likely would result from lower operating costs. Lower operating costs would presumably result
from the lower litigation costs.
125. See generally Love, 924 F.2d 1492; Texas Food, 81 F.3d 578.
126. See generally Love, 924 F.2d 1492.
127. Texas Food, 81 F.3d at 582
128. For a description of these parties, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Part V.A.
130. See supra Part IV.A.
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Food court's statements to the contrary,' 3 ' there is abundant
legislative history that suggests that Congress contemplated that
courts should consider the individual net worth of associations'
members.1
32
Beyond the legislative history that suggests that National's
holding is consistent with congressional intent, there are two public
policy reasons that support the propriety of National's holding. First,
taxpayers, as the ultimate source of EAJA funds, should not be held
accountable for funding the attorneys' fees of large corporations that,
coincidentally, are members of impecunious trade associations. It is
far more appropriate that the shareholders or other beneficiaries of
such well-endowed corporations bear the burden of those
corporations' operating costs.
A second policy concern relates to the previous consideration: the
courts' holdings in Texas Food and Love create an incentive for
presently unassociated EAJA-ineligible businesses to align
themselves with an EAJA-eligible association for the purpose of
litigating cost-free against the federal government. The growth of
such spurious associations can only produce a greater unwarranted
expense for the American taxpayer.
V. PROPOSAL
As the courts in Love and Texas Food correctly observed, the
EAJA's plain language seems to compel courts to adjudge trade
associations' EAJA eligibility without regard to the individual net
worth of such associations' members. 133 The aforementioned policy
reasons render this result unappealing. 34 In addition, such a result
partially defeats Congress's purposes for enacting the EAJA.1
35
While the National court went to great lengths to circumvent the
EAJA's plain language, its efforts failed, and the court ultimately
supported its holding solely with legislative history. 36 In light of the
131. See Texas Food, 81 F.3dat581.
132. Seesupra note 115.
133. See supra Part IV.A.
134. See supra Part lV.C.
135. See supra Part l.A.
136. See supra Part IILB.2.
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National opinion's weaknesses and the prevalence of the "plain
meaning rule," 137 it is doubtful that many courts will follow
National's holding. Congress should respond to this prospect by
amending the EAJA to eliminate the EAJA's extant eligibility
loophole for wealthy members of trade associations. The most
effective amendment for this purpose would be a simple addition to
the EAJA's definition of an eligible party.138 The amended section
might read:
"party" means... any association... that neither possesses a
net worth in excess of $7 million nor has a member that
possesses a net worth in excess of $7 million.
This amendment would still provide EAJA access for every party
that Congress intended to have such access, including businesses with
a net worth of less than $7 million. In the event that a trade
association possesses an EAJA-eligible member, but is disqualified
based on the proposed amendment because one of the association's
other members was EAJA-ineligible, the EAJA-eligible member
could still litigate in its own capacity as an EAJA-eligible individual.
In addition, the amendment would deny EAJA access to parties who
clearly can afford access to justice, such as the corporate giants in
Texas Food.
VI. CONCLUSION
EAJA-ineligible parties are presently abusing the EAJA by taking
an unwarranted free ride through the justice system at taxpayers'
expense. Although courts such as the National court occasionally
may bend the EAJA's plain language beyond its breaking point to
curb perceived abuses of the EAJA, a more reliable solution is
137. See SINGER, supra note 116, §46.01. The plain meaning rule states that, in the
absence of ambiguous statutory language, courts may not use sources extrinsic to a statute's
plain language in an effort to attribute meaning to a statute that is not supported by the statute's
plain language. See id.; see also Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States, 852 F.2d 549, 551
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 18-19 (8th Cir. 1902) (declaring that there is "no
safer or better settled canon of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous
it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses").
138. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
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necessary. Congress has the ability to provide such a solution by
amending the EAJA in accordance with this Note's proposed EAJA
amendment. Such an amendment would obviate any future attempts
to frustrate the EAJA's eligibility criteria through the use of trade
association puppetry.
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